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Narrowing California's Vicarious Standing
Policy: Fourth Amendment Rights of
Criminal Defendants and Their Victims
By Teresa Diane Chuh*
When a motion to suppress illegally seized1 evidence is
presented to a court, the moving party, usually the defendant, ini-
tially must establish standing2 to assert a violation of the fourth
amendment right against unreasonable search and seizures by
demonstrating "a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy." The United States Supreme Court and the California Su-
preme Court have developed different standards for determining
whether a criminal defendant possesses "a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy" and thus have created different rules
defining when a criminal defendant has standing to suppress Me-
gally seized evidence. The federal rule, set forth in Rakas v. Illi-
nois,5 holds that only a defendant who has a "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" in the area searched may claim standing to object
to the admission of illegally seized evidence.' The Court in Rakas
* B.A., 1976, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1980, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law.
1. This Note will not discuss the elements of illegal searches per se. References to
"illegally," "unlawfully," or "unconstitutionally" seized evidence presume that such a deter-
mination would be made by the court.
2. The term "standing" is used to include the right of a party already engaged in
litigation to raise certain objections as well as a person's right to invoke the judicial process.
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides in part. "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ......
4. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
5. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
6. Id. at 143. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Rakas in United States v.
Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980), in which defendant Payner was tried for falsifying a federal
income tax return by denying that he maintained a foreign bank account. At trial, he moved
to suppress a loan guarantee agreement pledging funds in the bank account as security. A
copy of the agreement had been seized from a briefcase that he had left in the hotel room of
an undercover agent. Id. at 2443. In excluding the evidence, the District Court held that
although the search did not impinge on Payner's own fourth amendment rights, the due
process clause of the fifth amendment and the ipherent supervisory power of the federal
court required exclusion of evidence tainted by the government's "'knowing and purposeful
bad faith hostility to any person's fundamental constitutional rights."' Id. (citation omit-
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found the defendants had no standing to challenge the use of in-
criminating evidence seized in violation of a third party's fourth
amendment rights.7 In so ruling, the Court narrowed the former
federal standard which provided that anyone "legitimately on the
premises" at the time of the illegal search could claim standing.8
The Rakas court nevertheless affirmed the maxim that "Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other con-
stitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted."9
Although the federal rule prohibits a defendant from claiming
third party or vicarious standing to assert the exclusionary rule,
California courts hold exactly the opposite.10 The difference stems
in part from the California Supreme Court's analysis of the nature
of fourth amendment rights, as evidenced by the landmark case of
People v. Martin."" In Martin, the court reasoned that the fourth
amendment, unlike the fifth,12 is couched in terms of a comprehen-
sive guarantee that the government will not engage in unreasona-
ble search and seizure. Accordingly, all defendants, as members of
the general citizenry, fall within the class protected by the consti-
tutional guarantee. Any defendant therefore has standing to object
to the admission of illegally seized evidence, whether or not his or
her personal rights have been violated and whether or not he or
she has been directly aggrieved by the search.'8 Reasoning that un-
ted). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's interpretation
of its supervisory power. United States v. Payner, 550 F.2d 206 (1979) (per curiam).
Citing Rakas, the Supreme Court reversed both lower court holdings, declaring that
Payner had no standing to suppress the loan agreement because his own legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy had not been invaded. 100 S. Ct. at 2447. Furthermore, it held that the
supervisory power does not authorize a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evi-
dence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court.
Id. •
7. 439 U.S. at 130-31. In so holding, the Court reaffirmed its earlier ruling in Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
8. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. .257, 267 (1960), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). See notes 27-32 & accompanying text
infra.
9. 439 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).
See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 389 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963); see also Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
10. See notes 11-14 & accompanying text infra.
11. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law .... "
13. In contrast, "[t]he exclusion in federal trials of evidence other wise competent but
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lawful searches more likely would be prevented if all persons had
standing to suppress illegally seized evidence,14 the supreme court
promulgated a vicarious standing rule in hopes of effectively deter-
ring illegal police behavior.
Although the California rule is theoretically sound, cases con-
struing Martin suggest that courts have encountered considerable
difficulty in applying the rule evenhandedly. This is particularly
true in cases where a defendant has attempted to assert vicariously
a violation of his or her victim's fourth amendment rights to sup-
press incriminating evidence.15 Although technically permissible
under the vicarious standing rule,"6 the California Supreme Court
has never allowed a defendant to supress evidence by invoking his
or her victim's constitutional rights. 7 In every case in which such a
possibility has arisen, the courts have evaded the standing issue by
finding the presence of exigent circumstances to justify otherwise
illegal searches.'8
Absent a finding of exigent circumstances, California's un-
restricted vicarious standing rule is too broad to allow socially tol-
erable results. In cases where a defendant attempts to suppress ev-
gathered by federal officials in violation of the Fourth Amendment is a means for making
effective the protection of privacy." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) over-
ruled on other grounds United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). The Court again
confirmed this rationale in Rakas stating: "The necessity for a showing of a violation of
personal rights is not obviated by recognizing the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary
rule .... "439 U.S. at 134 n.3. See also United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
14. Justice Traynor convincingly argued that "if law enforcement officers are allowed
to evade the exclusionary rule by obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of third par-
ties, its deterrent effect is to that extent nullified." 45 Cal. 2d at 760, 290 P.2d at 357. See
also Cleaver v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 297, 594 P.2d 984, 155 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1979);
Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 MNN. L. Rsy. 1083, 1145-47 (1959).
15. For example, if a defendant burglarizes A's home and police subsequently retrieve
evidence against the defendant during an illegal search of A's home, it is A's fourth amend-
ment rights that are violated. Under Martin, however, the defendant can stand as A's vicari-
ous representative and assert standing to object to the admission of evidence obtained by
unlawful search and seizure.
16. See notes 103-04 & accompanying text infra.
17. But see People v. Jager, 145 Cal. App. 2d 792, 303 P.2d 115 (1956) (court of appeal
allowed defendant burglars to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal police
microphone planted on the burglary victim's premises).
18. For example, in Cleaver v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 297, 594 P.2d 984, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 559 (1979), the court found that exigent circumstances validated a series of warrant-
less searches, thus avoiding the question of whether the defendant could assert his victim's
right to suppress evidence. The dissent protested this finding, accusing the majority of hav-
ing "invented" the exigent circumstances. Id. at 316, 594 P.2d at 995, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 570
(Mosk, J., dissenting). See notes 67-84 & accompanying text infra.
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idence by asserting the fourth amendment rights of a third party,
particularly when that party is a victim of the criminal act, the
courts should limit Martin to achieve a more equitable rule of
standing. If the court neglects to do so, vicarious standing is likely
to operate as an escape hatch for accused criminals rather than as
an effective mechanism for preserving the public's freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure.
This Note first discusses the development of standing to assert
the exclusionary rule in both the federal and California courts.
Second, the theoretical considerations underlying the California
rule will be examined. The Note next explores the problems Cali-
fornia courts have faced in cases where a defendant has attempted
to suppress evidence by asserting the fourth amendment rights of
his or her victim. Finally, the Note proposes limitations to the
Martin rule that are designed to limit the ability of a criminal de-
fendant to suppress illegally seized evidence when the defendant is
not a true vicarious representative of the individual whose fourth
amendment rights were violated.
The Development of Standing Rules
The Federal Rule
The exclusionary rule, first articulated in Weeks v. United
States,19 provides that evidence seized in violation of fourth
amendment rights protecting against unreasonable search and
seizure must be excluded from use at trial.20 Nearly fifty years af-
ter Weeks, Mapp v. Ohio2 1 made the exclusionary rule applicable
to state court proceedings 22 through the fourteenth amendment.23
Prior to Mapp, standing to invoke fourth amendment rights
had been strictly based on common law property principles. In es-
sence, a defendant could not claim standing to object to the use of
19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20. Id. at 398. See generally Note, Impending "Frontal Assault on the Citadel: The
Supreme Court's Readiness to Modify the Strict Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amend-
ment to a Good Faith Standard, 12 TuLSA L.J. 337, 341-48 (1976) (historical evolution of
the exclusionary rule).
21. 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).
22. Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cm.
L. REV. 342, 343 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Standing Comment].
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part: "No State shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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illegally seized evidence unless he or she claimed a "proprietary or
possessory interest in the premises" searched,2 or a "property in-
terest" in the item seized.25 This rule created an obvious dilemma
for defendants charged with possession of contraband, for example,
because "a defendant seeking to comply with. . the conventional
standing requirement [would be] forced to allege facts the proof of
which would tend, if indeed not be sufficient, to convict him. 26 In
Jones v. United States,27 the Supreme Court's first full discussion
of standing in search and seizure cases, traditional standing rules
were broadened to avoid such dilemmas. 8 In Jones, the Court af-
firmed the trial court's application of the personal interest require-
ment holding that a defendant could not claim standing merely by
"[asserting] prejudice.. . through the use of evidence gathered as
a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.1
29
The Court ruled that Jones had established a sufficient interest in
the place searched to assert standing, however, because he was "le-
gitimately on [the] premises"80 at the time of the illegal intru-
sion.3 1 Moreover, the Court held that in a case such as Jones,
where possession both convicts and confers standing, the necessity
for a preliminary showing of an interest in the property seized is
eliminated.
3 2
24. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973).
25. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951).
26. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1960) overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
27. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 100 S.
Ct. 2547 (1980).
28. In Jones, narcotics were found in an apartment where defendant Jones and others
were staying. A friend had provided Jones with a key and had given him permission to
occupy the apartment for a few days. Upon discovery of the contraband, Jones admitted
some of it was his and that he was living in the apartment. He later denied the truth of that
statement. The trial court denied Jones' motion to suppress the evidence because he had
alleged neither sufficient ownership of the seized articles nor an interest in the apartment
greater than that of an "invitee or guest." 362 U.S. at 259.
29. Id. at 261.
30. Id. at 267.
31. In extracting common law notions from the rules of standing, the Court stated:
"We are persuaded ... that it is ... ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law
which ... has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical .... Distinc-
tions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee' and 'guest,' often only of gossamer
strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards." Id. at 266.
32. Id. at 263. See also United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980). The rule of
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Despite liberalization of the standing rule in Jones, the Su-
preme Court did not abandon the principle that fourth amend-
ment rights are personal rights. In Alderman v. United States,38
the Court expressly barred a defendant from claiming standing to
object to evidence seized in violation of a co-defendant's fourth
amendment rights,3 ruling that a person is not "aggrieved" by an
illegal search and seizure merely through the introduction of dam-
aging evidence seized in violation of a third party's fourth amend-
ment rights.3 5
In Rakas v. Illinois83 the Court reaffirmed Alderman's inter-
pretation of the personal nature of fourth amendment rights, but
limited the rule previously ennunciated in Jones. In Rakas, the
Court held that passengers in a lawfully stopped car did not have
standing to object to a search beneath the seats and into the glove
compartment of the car solely because they were "legitimately on
[the] premises."38 In declaring the "legitimately on the premises"
test of Jones "too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth
"automatic standing" in cases involving crimes of possession was discarded in United States
v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). In overruling this aspect of Jones, the Court noted the
intervening decision in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), which held that
testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as
evidence of guilt at trial. 100 S. Ct. at 2551. The Court then reasoned that defendants were
no longer placed in jeopardy of conviction by asserting a possessory interest in a seized item
in order to invoke fourth amendment rights. Standing to assert the exclusionary rule there-
fore was limited to those who could demonstrate that their own fourth amendment rights
were violated. Id. at 2554.
33. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
34. In Alderman, the petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to threaten murder by
telephone based on evidence obtained through an illegal government wiretap of one conspir-
ator's phone. Each petitioner demanded retrial if any evidence used to convict him was the
product of the unauthorized surveillance. The Court denied the request stating: "T]he es-
tablished principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can
be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by
those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence .... Coconspira-
tors and codefendants have been accorded no special standing." Id. at 171-72. But see Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). These cases indicate that where the nature of the civil right
involved is of great importance, traditional standing rules should not be interjected to de-
feat a decision on the merits, particularly where it is difficult for the person primarily pro-
tected by the right to assert it. See also Binkiewicz v. Scafati, 281 F. Supp. 233 (D. Mass.
1968); United States v. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
35. 394 U.S. at 173-74 (1969).
36. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
37. Id. at 133-34.
38. See notes 27-31 & accompanying text supra.
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Amendment rights,"3 9 the Court limited the federal rule of stand-
ing to conform to the rationale of Katz v. United States.40 Katz
held that capacity to claim fourth amendment protection depends
not upon a property right in the invaded area, but upon whether
the person who claims the protection of the amendment has a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.41 The auto
passengers in Rakas thus did not have standing to suppress the
evidence seized because they had not demonstrated a "legitimate
expectation of privacy" in the car's glove compartment or the area
under the seats.42
Rakas thus focused on "the extent of a particular defendant's
rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on the theoreti-
cally separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing. 4 3
Nonetheless, it reaffirmed the underlying principle that fourth
amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously
asserted."
39. 439 U.S. at 142. The Court noted that applied literally, the statement that anyone
legitimately on the premises could claim standing to suppress "would permit a casual visitor
who has never seen, or been permitted to visit the basement of another's house to object to
a search of the basement if the visitor happened to be in the kitchen of the house at the
time of the search. Likewise, a casual visitor who walks into a house one minute before a
search of the house commences and leaves one minute after the search ends would be able
to contest the legality of the search. The first visitor would have absolutely no interest or
legitimate expectation of privacy in the basement, the second would have none in the house,
and it advances no purpose served by the Fourth Amendment to permit either of them to
object to the lawfulness of the search." Id. (footnote omitted).
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41. Id. at 353. The Court held that the government by electronically listening to and
recording defendant Katz's conversations in a telephone booth had "violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied ... and constituted [an unreasonable] 'search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
In Rakas, the Court pointed out that "a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy ... means
more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered .... [A burglar's] presence, in
the words of Jones, is 'wrongful'; his expectation [of privacy] is not 'one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id. at 143 n.12 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (citation omitted)). Despite rejection of the Jones "legitimately on the
premises" standard, the Court in Rakas noted that the result in Jones would remain the
same under the new "legitimate expectation of privacy" test. Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated: "The holding in Jones can best be explained by the fact that Jones
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises he was using and therefore could
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to a governmental invasion of
those premises, even though his 'interest' in those premises might not have been a recog-
nized property interest at common law." 439 U.S. at 143 (footnote omitted).
42. 439 U.S. at 148.
43. Id. at 139.
44. Id. at 138.
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The California Rule
In contrast to the federal rule, which allows only those individ-
uals whose personal rights have been violated by an illegal search
or seizure to assert standing to invoke the exclusionary rule, Cali-
fornia allows any member of the general citizenry to assert stand-
ing to object vicariously to illegally seized evidence.45 The rationale
underlying this radical departure from the federal rule is largely
attributable to the unique development of the exclusionary rule in
the California courts.
Six years before the United States Supreme Court decided
Mapp v. Ohio,46 the California Supreme Court voluntarily adopted
the exclusionary rule in People v. Cahan.47 Cahan and fifteen other
defendants had been convicted of conspiracy to engage in book-
making. On appeal, Cahan argued that his conviction should be
overturned because it was based on evidence obtained from ille-
gally planted microphones and from multiple warrantless searches.
In a four to three decision, the court reversed Cahan's conviction,
concluding that the evidence had been obtained in flagrant viola-
tion of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, the California con-
45. Despite the number of commentators calling for the suppression of all evidence
obtained by illegal searches and seizures, the Supreme Court of California has been the only
court to accept a rule of standing to invoke the exclusionary rule that is not dependent on
whether the defendant's personal privacy was invaded. See generally Allen, The Wolf Case:
Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1950); Broe-
der, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 Nsa. L. Rnv. 483, 540
(1963); Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. CAL. L. Rzv. 359, 368 (1941):
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L. J. 319, 335 (1962); Com-
ment, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488
(1965); Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L. J. 144 (1948).
Notwithstanding the observation in Rakas that "cars are not treated identically with houses
or apartments for Fourth Amendment purposes," 439 U.S. at 148, it is evident that the
Court's ruling applies to house searches as well. Justice Rehnquist asserted that "petition-
ers' claim is one which would fail even in an analogous situation in a dwelling," because they
made no showing of a "legitimate" expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id. at 148-49.
46. See notes 21-23 & accompanying text supra.
47. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). See Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained
by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL. L. Rav. 565 (1955). It has
been suggested that the decision in Cahan was motivated by a desire to overcome the
stigma connected with two extreme examples of misconduct by California police that had
been brought before the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952) (reversing a conviction for possession of narcotics where evidence was
obtained by stomach-pumping the defendant), and Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954)
(criticizing the police tactics which obtained evidence by placing a wiretap in defendant's
bedroom). See Comment, Standing to Suppress Evidence Obtained by Unconstitutional
Search and Seizure, 55 MiCH. L. Rav. 567, 568 n.5. (1956).
[Vol. 32
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stitution,5 and state and federal statutes."9 The court thus over-
turned nearly half a century of California precedent by adopting
the exclusionary rule in California as a "judicially created rule of
evidence." 50
In People v. Martin,"1 decided only a few months after Cahan,
the supreme court allowed fourth amendment rights to be asserted
vicariously to establish standing to object to the admission of evi-
dence obtained through illegal search and seizure. Defendant Mar-
tin had been arrested on the premises of an illegal bookmaking op-
eration. In challenging the validity of his arrest, claiming it arose
from an illegal search, Martin simultaneously disclaimed any inter-
est in the premises searched. Subsequently, the prosecutor con-
tended that Martin lacked standing to object to admission of the
evidence because his own constitutional rights had not been vio-
lated by the search. However, the argument was rejected. Writing
for a unanimous court, Justice Traynor concluded:
[I]f law enforcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary
rule by obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of third par-
ties, its deterrent effect is to that extent nullified .... [S]ince all
of the reasons that compelled us to adopt the exclusionary rule
are applicable whenever evidence is obtained in violation of con-
stitutional guarantees, such evidence is inadmissible whether or
not it was obtained in violation of the particular defendant's con-
stitutional rights.52
When the United States Supreme Court made the exclusion-
ary rule binding upon the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment in Mapp,53 the Cahan exclusionary rule became a constitu-
tional requirement. California's vicarious standing rule was
unaffected, however, and remained in force as a judicially created
rule of evidence." The continued vitality of Martin is attributable
to the United States Supreme Court holding in Ker v. California"
which gives the states freedom to contour their own search and
48. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 19 mirrors U.S. CONST. amend. IV and provides: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
seizures and searches, shall not be violated ....
49. 44 Cal. 2d at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.
50. Id. at 442, 282 P.2d at 911.
51. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
52. Id. at 760-61, 290 P.2d at 857.
53. See note 20 & accompanying text supra.
54. Note, The Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in California, 24 STAN. L. Ray. 947, 949 &
n.19 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Exclusionary Rule].
55. 347 U.S. 23 (1963). See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
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seizure rules as long as they remain within the minimum standards
mandated by the fourth amendment. 6
Rakas v. Illinois and People v. Martin: A Comparison
The process of developing standards for the admissibility of
evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure in a criminal
trial embodies a tension between competing social interests: deter-
rence of police misconduct on one hand, and admissibility of pro-
bative evidence on the other. As the exclusionary rule was adoped
to deter illegal police conduct, standing requirements were created
to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule's operation,57 thus strik-
ing a necessary balance between the two competing social interests.
Standing rules purport to establish a point at which the deterrent
effect of suppressing illegally seized evidence is exceeded by the
danger of freeing criminal suspects by the exclusion of probative
evidence from trial.58
Federal and California courts have reached different conclu-
sions as to the point at which the interest in deterring police mis-
conduct is outweighed by the societal interest in admission of pro-
bative evidence in criminal trials. This difference is most clearly
manifest in the requirements each have set forth to establish
standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. A strict standing require-
ment such as the Rakas rule reduces the number of defendants
able to challenge the admissibility of unlawfully seized evidence,
theoretically undercutting the objective of deterring illegal
searches.5 9 The rule yields this result because it permits only those
defendants whose fourth amendment rights have been violated to
benefit from the exclusionary rule's protection. 0 Nonetheless, the
56. 374 U.S. at 34.
57. Of all the limitations imposed upon the application of the exclusionary rule, stand-
ing requirements have been characterized as "the most devitalizing force." Grant, Circum-
venting the Fourth Amendment, 14 S. CAL. L. REv. 359, 368 (1941).
58. See generally Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 6
ARuz. L. Rav. 65, 77-80 (1964); Comment, Standing to Suppress Evidence Obtained by Un-
constitutional Search and Seizure, 55 MiCH. L. REv. 567, 579-81 (1957); Note, Standing
Requirement of the Fourth Amendment-Anachronism or Necessity?, 6 IDAHo L. Ray. 131,
146 (1969); Exclusionary Rule, supra note 54, at 958-61 & n.75.
59. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court reaffirmed that the exclusionary
"has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct." Id. at 2.
Hence, the argument follows that if the number of persons able to invoke the exclusionary
rule is reduced the number of undeterred illegal police searches will increase.
60. See note 59 supra. See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968).
[Vol. 32
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federal rule is justified by strong societal concerns. As the Court in
Rakas noted: "Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts
a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment
rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact
and the search for truth at trial is deflected.""e
Conversely, a lenient standing requirement such as the Martin
rule increases the number of defendants able to object to the ad-
mission of illegally seized evidence, theoretically deterring the fre-
quency of improper police intrusions.6 2 California's adoption of a
vicarious standing rule reflects the belief of the state supreme
court that deterring police misconduct is more important than
finding the "truth" through the admission of illegally seized evi-
dence.6 s In sum, the California Supreme Court strictly excludes the
fruits of illegal police conduct from trial because such conduct
serves to "encourage the kind of society that is obnoxious to free
men."
61. 439 U.S. at 137.
62. Exclusionary Rule, supra note 54, at 958. The argument against this assumption is
discussed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the Court noted that a court's refusal to
condone illegal police activity by excluding evidence does not bear a direct relationship to
deterrence. "Regardless of how effective the [exclusionary] rule may be, where obtaining
convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter invasions of con-
stitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are
willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal." Id. at 14
(footnote omitted).
63. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955).
64. Id. (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1954)). In contrast, the
United States Supreme Court held in Rakas that "[tihe necessity for a showing of a viola-
tion of personal rights is not obviated by recognizing the deterrent purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule. Despite the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule, we never have held that unlaw-
fully seized evidence is inadmissiable in all proceedings or against all persons." 439 U.S. at
134 n.3 (citations omitted).
Proponents of the Martin rule contend that strict standing rules like the one embodied
in Rakas have nothing to do with the concept of deterrence. See Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure & Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 390-91 (1964); Standing Com-
ment, supra note 22, at 357-58; Exclusionary Rule, supra note 54, at 961. Because standing
rules determine the suppression of evidence solely on the basis of a defendant's relationship
to a person or place, or to an item seized, they betray the overriding policy that "the govern-
ment must not be allowed to profit by its own wrong.. . . " People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d
755, 761, 290 P. 2d 855, 857 (1955). Furthermore, at least one commentator has theorized
that "[a strict] standing rule allows sophisticated law enforcers or their advisors to assess in
advance the likelihood of their search being invalidated by the exclusionary rule. This ad-
vanced warning thereby furnished them with relatively clear legal advice with which to plan
unlawful searches calculated to yield a maximum amount of useful evidence and a minimun
number of defendants with standing to object." Exclusionary Rule, supra note 54, at 959-
61. See Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71
YALE L.J. 599, 656-58 (1962); Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field of Search and
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The Martin Rule: Reconciling Theory and Practice
Martin presumably furthers the goal of deterring illegal police
conduct more effectively than Rakas because it enlarges the class
of individuals able to object to the admission of evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure. In practice, however, the rule of abso-
lute vicarious standing enunciated in Martin has not been applied
by the California courts without difficulty. Although a defendant
may theoretically suppress evidence by asserting the fourth
amendment rights of his or her victim, cases construing Martin
have been unwilling to allow the vicarious assertion of fourth
amendment rights in such instances.
6 5
To avoid the unjust result of allowing a defendant to assert his
or her victim's fourth amendment rights to suppress evidence, yet
still retain the Martin standard, California courts have relied on
finding exigent circumstances which serve to validate otherwise un-
lawful searches.6 A defendant implicated by evidence seized under
circumstances subsequently determined to be exigent therefore is
denied the opportunity to object to admission of evidence because
the search is not illegal.
The concept of exigent circumstances is a flexible one.67 In
People v. Ramey,68 the California Supreme Court held that while
information received from a reliable informant was sufficient to
create probable cause to believe the defendant had knowingly re-
ceived stolen property, there were no exigent circumstances justify-
ing the defendant's arrest in his home without a warrant. Writing
for a four to three majority, Justice Mosk noted: "'[e]xigent cir-
cumstances' means an emergency situation requiring swift action
to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property,
or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of
evidence. There is no ready litmus test for determining whether
Seizure, 6 ARIz. L. Rv. 65, 77 (1964); Standing Comment, supra note 22, at 358.
65. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 297, 594 P.2d 984, 155 Cal. Rptr.
559 (1979); People v. Solario, 19 Cal. 3d 760, 566 P.2d 627, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1977); People
v. Cook, 69 Cal. App. 3d 686, 138 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1977).
66. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 297, 594 P.2d 984, 155 Cal. Rptr.
559 (1979); People v. Solario, 19 Cal. 3d 760, 566 P.2d 627, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1977); People
v. Cook, 69 Cal. App. 3d 686, 138 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1977).
67. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); People v. Minjares, 24
Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1979); People v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 82,
634 P.2d 393, 120 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1975); People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 393 (1974); People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
68. 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).
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such circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extra-
ordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to the
officers." 69
In People v. Solario,70 the California Supreme Court extended
the concept of exigent circumstances, holding that a police officer
having probable cause to believe a burglary was in progress inside
an apartment need not comply with the "knock and announce" re-
quirement of Penal Code section 84471 before entering to make an
arrest. Although an officer's unexcused failure to comply with the
statute generally renders a subsequent search unlawful 72 the court
in Solario stated that the applicability of section 844 necessarily
was dependent upon the existence of circumstances which further
the statute's underlying purposes. The court reasoned that if none
of the statutory purposes could be served by requiring an officer to
knock and announce, and exigent circumstances were present, then
noncompliance with section 844 was permissible.7 It interpreted
the purposes of section 844 to be: "1) the protection of the privacy
of the individual in his home; 2) the protection of innocent persons
who may also be present on the premises where an arrest is made;
3) the prevention of situations which are conducive to violent con-
frontations between the occupant and individuals who enter his
home without proper notice; and 4) the protection of police who
might be injured by a startled and fearful householder." 4 The ma-
jority concluded that under the facts of Solario, none of the poli-
cies underlying section 844 would be served by requiring compli-
ance when an officer has probable cause to believe a burglary is in
progress.7 5 The court therefore held that the police officer's entry
was justified.7 6 The defendant's reliance on vicarious assertion of
his victim's rights to invoke the exclusionary rule was ruled to be
69. Id. at 276, 545 P.2d at 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
70. 19 Cal. 3d 760, 566 P.2d 627, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1977).
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1970) provides in part: "[T]o make an arrest ... a
peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the person to be
arrested is... after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which
admittance is desired."
72. See People v. Solario, 19 Cal. 3d 760, 763, 566 P.2d 627, 629, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725,
727 (1971); Duke v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 314, 324-25, 461 P.2d 628, 635, 82 Cal. Rptr.
348, 355 (1969).
73. 19 Cal. 3d at 763, 566 P.2d at 629, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
74. Id. (quoting Duke v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 314, 321, 461 P. 2d 628, 632, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 352 (1969)).
75. 19 Cal. 3d at 763, 566 P.2d at 629, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
76. Id. at 762, 566 P.2d at 628, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
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"misplaced" because the intrusion was justified on the basis of the
exigency of the burglary in process." Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Clark conceded that the Martin rule entitles a criminal defen-
dant to object to the introduction of evidence illegally seized from
a third person,78 but he concluded:
[T]he evidence introduced against the defendant was not illegally
seized from a third person. The 'third person' would be the defen-
dant's victim, the householder. Officer Freet did not violate the
householder's right to privacy by entering his residence to arrest
the defendant, he protected it. Therefore, there is no illegal
seizure of which the defendant may vicariously complain.79
The majority's conclusion that "requiring the officer to iden-
tify himself, announce his purpose and demand entry in such cir-
cumstances would impede the officer in protecting the house-
holder's privacy and property from the thief [and] ... would
jeopardize the officer's safety. . . by giving the burglar the oppor-
tunity to fortify his position and to take hostages"80 is unconvinc-
ing. It is difficult to distinguish the situation in Solario from any
other situation in which section 844 would apply. The statute is
directed only at those cases where arrest is contemplated. Thus, it
seems reasonable to assume that any potential arrestee unwilling
to be taken into custody would resist, flee or "otherwise fortify his
position" against an officer seeking to apprehend him or her. In
fact, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a police officer
could not gain an advantage over a potential arrestee by willfully
disobeying section 844. The "exigency" of the situation in Solario
thus seems manufactured for the purpose of rectifying the officer's
noncompliance with the statute. Moreover, it is evident that "but
for" the finding of exigent circumstances to excuse the officer, the
court would have been compelled under Martin to allow the defen-
dant to assert his victim's fourth amendment rights to suppress
the evidence against him.
The California Supreme Court's willingness to allow a defen-
dant to assert his or her victim's fourth amendment rights in the
absence of exigent circumstances has never been clear. However,
court of appeal opinions in People v. Cook81 and People v. Ortiz82
77. Id. at 764, 566 P.2d at 629, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis omitted).
80. Id. at 763-64, 566 P.2d at 629, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
81. 69 Cal. App. 3d 686, 138 Cal. Rptr 263 (1977).
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indicate an unwillingness to allow a defendant to vicariously assert
the fourth amendment rights of the victim of the crime. In Cook,
as in Solario, a suspected burglar urged that the failure to comply
with section 844 by the arresting officer was sufficient grounds
upon which to base a motion to suppress evidence. Writing for the
majority, Presiding Justice Puglia disagreed, stating:
In this appeal we are called upon to decide whether a residence
burglar, whose crime is discovered in progress and interrupted by
the police, may assert a violation of the right secured by Penal
Code section 844 to the very victim whose property he is pillag-
ing .... The law is neither an ass nor an idiot. To ask the ques-
tion therefore is to answer it.8s
In a similar manner, defendant trespassers in Ortiz were held not
to have standing to object to evidence seized by officers who had
failed to comply with section 844. In denying defendant's motion
to suppress, the court stated: "Penal Code section 844 is not to be
used to protect a trespasser's right to privacy in someone else's
home. A trespasser-or a burglar-cannot make another man's
home his castle. 84 Thus, despite the Martin rule's sanction of vi-
carious standing, the court of appeal has sujnmarily denied defen-
dants standing to assert their victims' fourth amendment rights to
suppress evidence.
The California Supreme Court recently declined the opportu-
nity to decide the issue in Cleaver v. Superior Court.8 5 Defendant
Eldridge Cleaver and his accomplice Bobby Hutton 8 had engaged
in a gun battle with police while hiding in the basement of a stran-
ger's home. The confrontation ended when a tear gas cannister
thrown by police ignited the basement. After firefighters extin-
guished the blaze, police officers entered the basement without a
search warrant.8 7 They left a short time later because the tear gas
severely impaired their vision. Two and one-half hours later, when
the gas had partially dissipated, the officers reentered the base-
ment and again began a warrantless search for physical evidence.
They retrieved some items and returned again six hours later for a
82. 276 Cal. App. 2d 1, 80 CaL Rptr. 469 (1969).
83. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 688, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (footnote omitted).
84. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 5, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
85. 24 Cal. 3d 297, 594 P.2d 984, 155 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1979).
86. See note 102 infra.
87. 24 Cal. 3d at 301-02, 594 P.2d at 985-86, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 560-61.
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third search, still without a warrant." At no time did the home-
owner consent to the searches. The trial court refused to suppress
the evidence found in the basement, holding that exigent circum-
stances existed to justify all three warrantless searches., 9
In the court of appeal, Cleaver attempted to assert the fourth
amendment right of the homeowner to suppress the evidence
seized. Citing Ortiz and Solario, the court held that "a trespasser
is not entitled to assert the householder's right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures."90 The court therefore reasoned
that "[ilnsofar as the defendant was a trespasser, he has no stand-
ing to assert any violation of the householder's privacy.
91
In light of the Martin rule, the court of appeal's analysis of
the standing question is erroneous.92 The court failed to note that
standing in California is not based on whether a defendant is "le-
gitimately on the premises,"98 but whether the search and seizure
are legal." Despite acknowledging this misstatement of the stand-
ing rule, the California Supreme Court in Cleaver affirmed the trial
court's suppression of the evidence on the grounds that the cir-
cumstances were sufficiently exigent to justify the warrantless
searches.9 5 The court's comments regarding standing were thus
88. One codefendant was arrested in a house adjacent to the burned house, and after
his arrest, the owner of the home found car keys which the codefendant had apparently left
behind. Police located the car and towed it to a police parking lot where they used the keys
to open the trunk. Several weapons and ammunition were found. Id. at 307-08, 594 P.2d at
989-90, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 564-65. For a more comprehensive discussion of automobile
searches, see Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception without Justifica-
tion, 32 HAsTiNGs L.J. 127 (1980).
89. 141 Cal. Rptr 562, 565 (1978), aff'd on other grounds, 24 Cal. 3d 297, 594 P.2d 984,
155 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1979).
90. 141 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
91. Id. at 571.
92. This is not to say that the court of appeal's ruling on the standing question was
not correct. Like the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal found exigent circum-
stances to justify the warrantless searches.
93. See notes 27-30 & accompanying text supra.
94. As an appellate court judge pointed out in Shuey v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App.
3d 535, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1973): "'In a jurisdiction, such as ours, where a defendant need
not have standing to object to illegally obtained evidence, a seizure is either legal or illegal,
regardless of the person against whom the prosecution seeks to introduce the evidence.' The
identity of the defendant is a neutral factor." Id. at 543, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 457 (quoting
People v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. App. 2d 228, 231, 78 Cal. Rptr. 830, 832 (1969)).
95. The court looked to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), which upheld a warrantless police search of a building conducted
seven hours after firefighters had extinguished the flames and a fire chief had entered the
premises seeking evidence of arson. The California court concluded that "[t]he Tyler ratio-
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confined to a single paragraph:
In this case defendant intruder vicariously asserts the privacy
rights of the owner. As we have noted, the police had ample rea-
son to suspect that weapons, ammunition and perhaps other po-
tentially dangerous items... remained in the fire damaged base-
ment. Under the circumstances it is wholly unrealistic to presume
that an absent property owner would either expect, or desire, the
police to postpone, until a search warrant was obtained, entry
onto the premises whether for a search for evidence or to protect
the property.9"
The supreme court's argument is unconvincing for two rea-
sons. First, the facts of Cleaver reveal that the exigency of the cir-
cumstances was dubious. In a lengthy dissent, Justice Mosk ob-
served that on the face of the record the risks that the majority
deemed exigent were, in fact, neither substantial nor imminent.
17
Moreover, exigent circumstances can only be recognized "upon 'a
showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course im-
perative.' "911 The prosecution, Justice Mosk noted, "made no effort
whatever to sustain their burden [which] the majority shouldered
. . . themselves."9 9 Justice Mosk thus concluded that the majority
"invented" exigent circumstances to avoid confronting the stand-
ing issue.100
Second, even if exigent circumstances could be presumed, the
court failed to consider whether the homeowner might have some
reason for asserting the exclusionary rule to bar evidence obtained
in the illegal search on his or her property. Instead, the majority
speculatively concluded that "[u]nder such circumstances it is
wholly unrealistic to presume that an absent property owner would
. . . desire the police to postpone, until a search warrant was ob-
tained, entry onto the premises . ".1.. ,0  If the homeowner in
Cleaver, however, had cultivated marijuana plants in the living
nale is fully applicable to the present case.... Considering the hour, place and general
circumstances, the delayed entries, caused by the officer's physical inability to conduct a
thorough search, were constitutionally permissible." 24 Cal. 3d at 305, 594 P.2d at 988, 155
Cal. Rptr. at 563.
96. 24 Cal. 3d at 306, 594 P. 2d at 989, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
97. Id. at 314, 594 P.2d at 994, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
98. Id. at 309, 594 P.2d at 990, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 564 (citation omitted) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
99. Id. at 309-10, 594 P.2d 990-91, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66.
100. Id. at 316, 594 P.2d at 995, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
101. Id. at 306, 594 P.2d at 989, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
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room, or stored illegal firearms in the basement, it would be
equally "unrealistic" for the court to presume the homeowner
would not have preferred that the police obtain a search warrant
before entering the premises.102
Rather than justifying an otherwise illegal police search
through exigent circumstances and speculative presumptions, the
Cleaver court could have declared the Martin rule too broad in
cases where a defendant seeks to assert vicariously his or her vic-
tim's fourth amendment rights, and created an exception to limit
the Martin rule in such instances. The final section of this Note
will suggest two limitations to Martin designed to preserve the de-
terrent purposes underlying the exclusionary rule, yet prevent vi-
carious standing when a defendant is not a true vicarious represen-
tative of the subject of the unlawful search.
A Proposed Solution
Under the Martin rule, a defendant may assert vicariously the
fourth amendment rights of any subject 0 s of an illegal police
102. In his dissent in Cleaver, Justice Mosk accused the majority of having made "bad
law" by finding exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless searches. He also added: "I
wonder if we would have had as much trouble disposing of this case if it had involved an
obsure pair of robbers caught in a routine shootout with the police, rather than Eldridge
Cleaver and the Black Panthers in a well-publicized confrontation during the turbulent days
of the 1960's." Id. at 323, 594 P.2d at 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
103. The "subject" of the search is the person whose own privacy rights are invaded
by the illegal police instrusion. The "subject" may fall within one of three classes of persons:
(1) victims of the defendant's act who are later the subjects of an illegal search, (2) code-
fendants whose privacy is invaded by an unlawful intrusion, or (3) third parties, not in-
volved in the defendant's crime, whose privacy is unlawfully invaded by police searching for
evidence against the defendant.
(1) The victim of defendant's act. If a defendant breaks into A's home-as in Solario and
Cleaver-A becomes the victim of the defendant's act. If police improperly search A's home
and retrieve incriminating evidence, the defendant may assert, under Martin, A's fourth
amendment rights, and thus may object to the admission of the evidence. In a jurisdiction
that follows the federal rule, however, the defendant would be barred from suppressing the
evidence because his or her own "legitimate expectation of privacy" had not been violated
by the illegal search of A's home.
(2) A codefendant whose privacy is invaded. If the government attempts to prosecute both
A and the defendant with information obtained from the illegal wiretap of A's phone, the
defendant may claim vicarious standing to object to the fruit of the wiretap under Martin.
However, he or she could not do so in a jurisdiction following the federal rule. As the Court
stated in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 172, 174 (1969), "coconspirators and
codefendants have been accorded no special standing .... No rights of the victim of an
illegal search are at stake when the evidence is offered against some other party."
(3) A third party not involved in defendant's crime. In this category, the subject of the
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search, even if that person is the victim of his or her-crime.104 The
rule is intended to maximize deterrence of unlawful police conduct
by increasing the number of persons able to suppress illegally
seized evidence. However, in cases such as Solario and Cleaver,
where a defendant attempts to suppress evidence by asserting his
or her victim's fourth amendment rights, common sense and fair-
ness have been outweighed by a blind commitment to the theory of
deterrence. In such cases, the rule is too broad.
To achieve maximum deterrence of unlawful police conduct,
yet eliminate the dilemma in cases such as Solario and Cleaver,
the California Supreme Court should limit the Martin rule. Two
proposals are considered. The first suggests a broad modification of
the rule that would give all subjects of illegal police searches, in-
cluding the victims of crimes, 105 the option of waiving or asserting
their fourth amendment rights, thereby making a defendant's abil-
ity to assert vicariously those rights conditional upon the actions of
the individual directly aggrieved by the illegal search.106 The sec-
ond proposal suggests a narrowly drawn limitation which would
automatically preclude a defendant from suppressing evidence by
asserting the rights of the victim of the crime. The latter proposal,
unlike the first, would not apply to all cases involving unreasonable
search. Either proposal adequately fulfills the supreme court's
commitment to deter illegal police conduct, yet serves to ensure
that those invoking the exclusionary rule are true vicarious repre-
sentatives of the individual whose fourth amendment rights were
violated by the illegal search and seizure.
illegal search differs from the example above, because while he or she is not the "target" or
object of the search, his or her privacy nevertheless is invaded. For example, if police ar-
rested a defendant for armed robbery and later conducted an illegal search of his or her
parents' home, the defendant might object to the search on the ground that he or she was
the "target" of the search, i.e., the person against whom the search was directed. Under
Martin, such a defendant can assert vicarious standing to suppress evidence seized. Under
the federal rule, however, the concept of "target" standing is expressly rejected unless the
defendant can demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 135 (1978).
104. See note 103 supra.
105. "Crimes" as discussed herein will encompass only serious felonies such as homi-
cide, aggravated assault, rape, armed robbery, arson, and burglary; crimes where victims are
readily identifiable. Under this definition, "victims" of prostitution, gambling and narcotics
violations will be excluded from consideration.
106. If the subject of an illegal search "waives" his or her fourth amendment rights,
those rights cannot flow vicariously to the defendant. Conversely, if the subject "asserts" or
"invokes" his or her rights, they can flow vicariously to the defendant.
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The Waiver Alternative
An intermediate rule of standing that serves the broad deter-
rent purpose underlying California's standing rule yet protects the
privacy rights of subjects of illegal searches may be developed by
permitting vicarious standing, but allowing the subject of an illegal
search to waive the right to object to a violation of his or her
fourth amendment rights. Waiver could occur through in camera 1 °
testimony given prior to a pretrial motion to suppress evidence
under Penal Code section 1538.5.108 In camera examination would
protect the privacy of the subject of the illegal search yet allow the
presence of counsel to present and challenge the waiver. 09 A sec-
tion 1538.5 motion is a defendant's exclusive means of suppressing
107. An in camera waiver of the fourth amendment rights of the subject of the illegal
search would not violate the defendant's constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses
because such testimony only affects the availability of certain evidence and would not tend
to incriminate the defendant at trial. In People v. House, 12 Cal. App. 3d 756, 90 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1970), the court of appeal held that "[b]ench and chambers conferences held out of the
personal presence of a defendant at which issues of law are mooted ... are not a basis of
error absent a showing that [the defendant's] absence thwarted a 'fair and just hearing."'
Id. at 767, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (quoting People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 206,
207-08, 327 P. 2d 157, 174 (1958), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 206 (1959)). See
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934). In cases involving in camera waiver by an
illegal search subject, the defendant would be able to make a prima facie showing that his
or her absence during the waiver "thwarted a fair and just hearing." The prosecution would
then be required to show that the waiver was given in accordance with established principles
of constitutional waiver. See People v. LaVergne, 64 Cal. 2d 265, 411 P.2d 309, 49 Cal. Rptr.
557 (1966); People v. Luker, 63 Cal. 2d 464, 407 P.2d 9, 47 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1965); People v.
Garner, 234 Cal. App. 2d 212, 44 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1965); In re Shlette, 232 Cal. App. 2d 407,
42 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1965).
108. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1980) provides in part- "A defendant may
move ... to suppress... evidence ... obtained as a result of a search or seizure on either
of the following grounds: (1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable. (2)
The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because (i) the warrant is insufficient
on its face; (ii) the property or evidence obtained is not that described in the warrant; (iii)
there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; (iv) the method of execution of
the warrant violated federal or state constitutional standards; (v) there was any other vio-
lated federal or state constitutional standards." At a § 1538.5 hearing, the defendant has the
burden of producing evidence to establish a prima facie case of fourth amendment illegality.
People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 341 P.2d 1 (1959); People v. Carson, 4 Cal. App. 3d 782, 84
Cal. Rptr. 699 (1970). Thereafter, the burden of proof rests on the prosecution tor show the
search was justified. People v. Carson, 4 Cal. App. 3d 782, 84 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1970). See
People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 341 P.2d 1 (1959).
109. In Camera examination by the judge with both counsel present would be used to
protect the privacy of the victim. Presence of both counsel is necessary because the prosecu-
tion must be aware of facts surrounding the subject's waiver to be able to sustain its burden
of showing the voluntariness of the waiver. The defense also would need to be present to
determine whether a challenge to the waiver should be made.
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the fruits of illegal searches and seizures.11 If in camera testimony
is received from the subject of an illegal search and seizure, a deci-
sion by the subject to waive his or her fourth amendment rights
could reduce, or perhaps eliminate, the time expended on the sec-
tion 1538.5 hearing because of the preliminary determination of
whether a defendant has standing to bring the motion. If a defen-
dant's section 1538.5 motion is denied on grounds that he or she
has no standing, this proposed modification to the Martin rule
would still allow the defendant an opportunity to appeal the ruling
under established procedures.'
A search subject's absence or refusal to appear at an in cam-
era hearing would create the rebuttable presumption that the sub-
ject has not waived his or her rights."12 This presumption must
arise under well-settled principles applicable to waiver of fourth
amendment rights prior to a search.11 In those cases, waiver "must
be proven to be unequivocal [and] freely and intelligently given
... ,,114 Before a court can hold that a search subject has waived
his or her constitutional protection under the fourth amendment,
the prosecutor must present clear and convincing evidence to that
effect.115 Such a requirement would also serve to ensure against the
possibility that search subjects might be unduly influenced by law
enforcement officials to waive their fourth amendment rights."6 In
110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(m) (West Supp. 1980). A defendant charged with a
felony may bring a motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary hearing, in municipal or
justice court. See id. § 1538.5(f). If the motion is denied, the defendant is given 10 days to
request a special hearing in superior court. Id. § 1538.5(i). If the superior court also denies
the motion, the defendant is given 30 days to seek extraordinary review of the ruling. Id.
111. A defendant may seek further review of the fouith amendment issues on appeal
from a conviction, even though the judgment is predicated on a guilty plea, provided he or
she at some point moved for the return of property or suppression of the evidence. See
Knoepp, California's Suppression Statute-An Examination of Penal Code § 1538.5, 10
SAN DIEGO L. Rnv. 209, 230 (1973).
112. This attitude is consistent with the traditional presumption against waiver of
constitutional rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1961).
113. J. VARON, SEARCHEs, SmzuRms imD IMMuNrTEs 289 (2d ed. 1974).
114. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See People v. Jennings,
142 Cal. App. 2d 160, 298 P.2d 56 (1956); People v. Preston, 341 Ill. 407, 173 N.E. 383
(1930).
115. See Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
116. General principles for determining the voluntariness of a waiver could be applied
to avoid this problem. See notes 114-15 & accompanying text supra and notes 117-19 &
accompanying text infra. "[A] constitutional right may be waived, but in so doing, the indi-
vidual must intelligently, specifically and fully give such consent. There must not be any
coercion or duress involved, directly or indirectly. Where this issue requires a determination
by a court, the burden is upon the prosecutor to unequivocally establish the voluntariness of
September 1980]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
cases where the subject of the illegal search does not appear, there-
fore, defendants would be allowed to assert vicariously a search
subject's fourth amendment rights under Martin.
Deterring unlawful police conduct implicates two separate but
intertwined rights contained in the fourth amendment: the per-
sonal right to be free from illegal police conduct, and a guarantee
to the general citizenry that unlawfully seized evidence will not be
used in court so as to deter the police from invading privacy rights
in the future. 17 Allowing the subject of an unlawful search the op-
tion of waiving his or her fourth amendment rights and thus
preventing these rights from flowing automatically to the defen-
dant through vicarious standing makes particular sense in cases
where the defendant attempts to assert the rights of the victim of
his or her crime. Crimes against specific persons or property, such
as homicide, arson, rape, and robbery impact the rights of individ-
uals more immediately than the rights of the general citizenry.
Thus, a victim's right to waive his or her constitutional rights
should take precedence over the public's interest in preventing ille-
gal police conduct. More importantly, the victim's right should not
flow automatically to the defendant when the defendant's interest
is not in preserving his or her victim's privacy rights but in escap-
ing conviction. In such cases, the defendant is not a true vicarious
representative of the victim.
If a search subject is given an opportunity to waive fourth
amendment rights under the proposed rule, he or she can decide
whether those rights have been invaded to such an extent that he
or she desires vindication by permitting a defendant to suppress
evidence seized in the process of violation. Subjects thus would be
allowed to choose whether vindiation of their privacy rights is
worth allowing the courts possibly to acquit guilty defendants for
lack of evidence. Currently, the courts alone assume the role of
making that determination on broad theoretical grounds. As
demonstrated by cases like Cleaver and Solario, however, theory
cannot always be reconciled with practical needs."""
Adopting the proposed modification would neither offend nor
undercut the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule. If a po-
the waiver." 1 J. VARON, SEAncHEs, SuzuRns AND IMMUNrrS 288 (2d ed. 1974). Cf. Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel).
117. Standing Comment, supra note 22, at 356-57.
118. See notes 65-102 & accompanying text supra.
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lice officer contemplating an illegal search cannot anticipate
whether the search subject will assert or waive his or her fourth
amendment rights, the officer will be just as likely to refrain from
illegal conduct as under the present vicarious standing rule.119 The
proposal, however, creates a rule of standing with sufficient flex-
ibility to prevent its application in situations like Cleaver and So-
lario where it would otherwise yield unjust results. As the United
States Supreme Court noted in United States v. Calandra,1 20 there
is nothing inherent in the exclusionary rule which requires its ap-
plication "in all proceedings."121 Rather, it should be utilized only
when "its broad deterrent purposes" 122 will be served.
It may be argued that giving subjects of illegal searches, par-
ticularly crime victims, the power to waive their fourth amendment
rights improperly divests the state of its ability to prosecute
crimes. However, it is evident that third parties have always had
the power to affect substantially every stage of criminal proceed-
ings.123 One commentator has noted that "[m]any victims of crime,
especially crimes involving real or threatened personal injury, seek
aggressive prosecution of the wrongdoer. Some victims. . . [how-
ever] are ambivalent about formal prosecution, and some actually
seek to discourage the prosecutor from pursuing criminal
charges.
'124
Realistically, by reporting or not reporting crimes, third par-
ties often hold the absolute power to influence the state's ability to
prosecute. 25 Additionally, they can direct the fate of criminal cases
by deciding whether to press charges, testify at trial, or seek in-
volvement in certain postconviction decisions regarding sentencing,
probation, and parole.1 26 It thus seems evident that allowing an il-
legal search subject to waive his or her fourth amendment
rights-thereby affecting a defendant's ability to suppress evi-
dence-does not bestow an inordinate amount of prosecutorial
119. See Standing Comment, supra note 22, at 357. If there is any chance the evi-
dence will be suppressed, however, it seems more logical to assume that police officers will
opt for a search warrant as a "safety measure" whenever possible.
120. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
121. Id. at 348.
122. Id.
123. See Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution and Disposition of a Crimi-
nal Case, 28 VAND. L. Ray. 931 (1975).
124. Id. at 946.
125. Id. at 948.
126. Id. at 956-64.
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power in a third party.
Finally, implementing the new rule would impose little addi-
tional administrative burden on the courts and, in fact, could
shorten the existing procedure. At most, the rule would require
subpoena and in camera examination of the subject. 12 7 If the sub-
ject successfully waives his or her fourth amendment rights, how-
ever, the defendant's motion to suppress evidence is automatically
denied for lack of standing and the legality of the questioned po-
lice activity need not be adjudicated.
If the modified rule had been applied in Solario and Cleaver,
the defendants in both cases could have claimed standing to object
to the evidence seized, contingent on testimony from the home-
owners whose rights they sought to assert vicariously. Had the
homeowners waived their rights, the court could have addressed
the issues fairly, in the words of the Cleaver dissent, without hav-
ing to "invent" facts to justify the result. 2 8 Moreover, in Cleaver
the court would not have had to "presume"1 29 that the homeowner
would have waived objection to the warrentless police searches of
her home, for it actually could have determined the question.
The Automatic Exception
At the very least, the California Supreme Court should adopt
an automatic exception to the Martin rule in cases where a defen-
dant attempts to suppress evidence by asserting the fourth amend-
ment rights of his or her victim. Rather than relying on exigent
circumstances to avoid applying Martin, the approach taken in So-
lario and Cleaver, the court should simply provide that defendants
cannot claim vicarious standing based on violations of their vic-
tim's fourth amendment rights. Because this exception is based on
general principles of fairness rather than on the rights of specific
individuals, availability of the victim would be immaterial to its
application.
The most compelling justification for the proposed exception
is fairness. In Malinski v. New York, 5 0 the United States Supreme
127. See notes 107-16, 122 & accompanying text supra.
128. Cleaver v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 297, 316, 594 P.2d 984, 995, 155 Cal. Rptr.
559, 570 (1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 306, 594 P.2d at 989, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 564. See notes 65-102 & accompany-
ing text supra.
130. 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
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Court inextricably linked the concepts of due process and fairness
"[imposing] upon this Court an exercise of judgment. to ascer-
tain whether [proceedings leading to conviction] offend those ca-
nons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English speaking peoples, even toward those charged with the most
heinous offenses." 13 1 In *Rochin v. California,3 2 the Court noted
that determinations of fairness "[require] an evaluation based on a
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced
order to facts exactly and fairly stated, [and] on the detached con-
sidertion of conflicting claims."133
The unfairness of allowing a defendant to suppress evidence
by asserting the fourth amendment rights of his or her victim is
evident even prior to such "disinterested inquiry." Crimes against
specific persons or their property affect individual rights more im-
mediately than the rights of the general public.134 In cases of rape
or homicide, that impact can be devastating. Nonetheless, under
the present Martin rule, a female rape victim is powerless to pre-
vent a defendant from asserting her fourth amendment rights to
suppress evidence recovered during an improper search of her
home. In short, the present rule would allow the rape victim's own
constitutional rights to be used against her. It may be argued that
the concept of a single victim is inaccurate because a criminal mis-
deed wrongs the entire society. 35 Common sense, however, dictates
that individual victims of crimes are the parties most directly in-
jured. This fact has been acknowledged by numerous state and lo-
cal governments which have adopted programs to compensate vic-
tims of crime. 36
Once it has been determined that the present Martin rule
yields unfair results in cases where a defendant attempts to sup-
press evidence by asserting vicariously his or her victim's fourth
131. Id. at 416-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
132. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
133. Id. at 172.
134. See notes 115.22 & accompanying text supra.
135. See W. LAFAvE & A. Sco'rr, HANDBOOK ON CmN.xL LAW 11 (1972). See also,
Lamborn, Toward a Victim Orientation in Criminal Theory, 22 RUTGERS L. Rsv. 733
(1968); Schafer, The Proper Role of a Victim Compensation System, 21 CRmiE & DELIN-
QUENCY 45 (1975); Note, But What About the Victim? The Foresaken Man in American
Criminal Law, 22 U. FIA. L. Ray. 1 (1969).
136. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 13959-13969.1 (West Supp. 1980) (government re-
habilitation of California residents who suffer a pecuniary hardship as the direct result of a
crime).
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amendment rights, it is necessary to determine whether counter-
vailing interests in maximized deterrence of illegal police conduct
balance the apparent injustice. A point of diminishing returns18
exists where the deterrent effect of suppressing evidence is out-
weighed by the danger of freeing additional criminal suspects. This
Note takes the position that the present Martin rule operates far
beyond the point of diminishing ieturns in cases where it sacrifices
common sense and fairness in favor of a blind commitment to the-
ory. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Davis v.
Mills,18 s laws are "intended to preserve practical and substantial
rights, not to maintain theories."' 319
From a practical standpoint, an automatic exception to the
Martin rule would create even less of a procedural burden on the
courts than the broader waiver alternative.140 The exception simply
would operate whenever a defendant attempted to suppress evi-
dence by asserting the fourth amendment rights of his or her vic-
tim. Moreover, there would be no need for the legislature to mod-
ify or expand existing procedures in hearings on motions to
suppress made pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.141 In addi-
tion, courts would not be burdened with the added expenses and
delay of entertaining in camera proceedings to adjudicate ques-
tions of waiver. In fact, adopting the automatic exception would
completely obviate the necessity for section 1538.5 hearings in
cases where a victim's rights were in issue.
Adopting the proposed exception also would assure uniformity
of results in cases such as Cleaver and Solario because the subjec-
tive desires of individual victims would not affect the rule's appli-
cation. In contrast, the victim's desires could substantially influ-
ence application of standing rules under the waiver alternative.
Finally, adopting the proposed exception would preclude any pos-
sibility of undue influence over the alleged victim from prosecutors
or defense attorneys because its application would be automatic.
I Conclusion
Application of either proposed modification of the Martin rule
137. See note 58 & accompanying text supra.
138. 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
139. Id. at 457.
140. See notes 109-15 & accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 108-11 & accompanying text supra.
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would avoid the danger that a defendant may assert the fourth
amendment rights of the victim of his or her criminal act. More
importantly, limitations on Martin would obviate the need to "in-
vent" exigent circumstances on a case by case basis to bar a defen-
dant from claiming vicarious standing to suppress evidence.
Because California's vicarious standing rule is not constitu-
tionally mandated, but rather is a judicially created rule of evi-
dence, 1 2 the state supreme court has full power to modify or
elimiate the present rule.1 43 By adopting either of the recom-
mended limitations, the court could ensure the exclusionary rule
will continue to function as a deterrent of illegal police conduct
without undermining the personal rights of subjects of illegal
searches.
142. See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
143. If the waiver alternative is adopted, however, the legislature would be required to
amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 to give the modification procedural substance. See notes
109-11 & accompanying text supra.
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